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1. Introduction 
In much of the literature, the recognition of a (new) country can be seen as the ultimate sign of 
support from one country to another (Hechter 1992: 267). This recognition, as well as the 
interpretation of positive international law, can be approached in three different ways: politically, 
morally and legally. Based on China’s historic attitude against the secession of Taiwan and its 
firm and explicit stance against the secession of Kosovo in 2009, it might be that China’s rejecting 
stance towards secession applies to all cases of secession, both domestic and foreign. China has 
always remained quite independent from the West in its evaluation of foreign problems and 
international security issues. It is well known that China holds a strong attachment to the concepts 
of inviolability of state sovereignty and territorial integrity in its foreign diplomacy, more than 
any other cultural norms or values (Strauss 2009). However, on July 6th 2011, China was one of 
the first countries to recognise South Sudan after its secession from Sudan. This went against 
China’s former antisecessionist attitude and its general approach towards it foreign relations. 
Meanwhile, not far from South Sudan in the Horn of Africa, another strong case for international 
recognition has remained unanswered for more than two decades: In 1991, Somaliland has 
withdrawn itself from its former union with Somalia, created in July 1960 after both countries 
gained independence from their former colonies, Britain and Italy respectively (Farley 2010). 
Despite Somaliland’s attainments in its democratic and economic development of the last two 
decades and the seemingly present basic elements of statehood, it still does not enjoy China’s 
recognition to this day. Even when a constitutional referendum in 2001 reaffirmed the support of 
ninety-seven percent of the population in favour of independence, China did not react (Eggers 
2007). Therefore, the question of this thesis is: ‘what factors explain China’s shift in attitude 
towards secession in the most recent example of South Sudan, whilst not recognizing the previous 
secession of Somaliland?’  
  In this case study, the secessionist intiatives of Somaliland and South Sudan will be 
examined to determine which factors influence China’s change in its foreign policy with respect 
to recognition. A closer look will be given to China’s initial view on secessionism, to determine 
China’s motives against secession. Secondly, China’s increasingly complex and realistic approach 
to its foreign diplomacy will be used as a critical viewpoint on the two different processes of 
secession in the case study. Thirdly, an examination of China’s political and economic interests in 
both countries is utilized to see how this might have affected China’s involvement in both cases. 
And finally, a wider understanding of China’s growing power in the international arena is 
necessary to determine if China’s attitude is changing. Other authors have argued that China’s 
normative attitude in the international arena might be converging towards foreign cultural values 
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(Kerr and Xu 2014; Shambaugh 2011).  
  This in-depth case study will provide more insight on the weight and relevance of China’s 
political attitude versus other factors that could have an influence on China’s recognition of a 
secessionist state. This insight might also contribute to a wider understanding of China’s possible 
changing position within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), now that its international 
power is growing alongside its economy.  
 
2. Literature Study 
This literature study will consist of three sections. The first part will address China’s view on 
secession in general. China’s view on positive international law with respect to secessionism and 
its implications for political recognition will be explained with China’s stance towards domestic 
secessionist groups. Secondly, China’s growing involvement in Africa will be discussed in 
chronological order. This involvement will be discussed through a political and economic 
perspective. And lastly, China’s growing status as a world power is scrutinized for its possible 
implications for China’s stance towards secessionism.  
2.1 China’s view on secessionism 
A topic of political science literature is to discuss to which extent secessionism differs from the 
liberation of host states after colonialism. After the wave of decolonization in the 1950s en 1960s, 
new movements kept emerging, aspiring independence and sovereignty; increasingly based on 
ethnic recognition or the pursuit of self-determination (Silva 2014, p. 1). These demands for 
secessionism, defined by Hechter as ‘formal withdrawals from a central political authority by a 
member unit on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status’ (1992, p. 267), were 
problematic for the international political system since the separation from a central political 
authority politically and legally differed from ending the political control from a colonial host 
state (Kreuter 2010, p. 369). These new claims for independence lacked an international accepted 
legitimate motive, and violated the sovereignty of a host state. Moreover, many constitutions had 
not yet made specific provisions for such eventual cases of secessionism, so secessionism neither 
complied nor violated international law (Jamar & Vigness 2010, p. 914; Christopher 2011, p. 
126). The question remained when a state was justified to call itself a state for others to recognize.  
  In October 1970, all members of the UN General Assembly, including the Republic of 
China (ROC) on Taiwan, adopted the Friendly Relations Declaration in the UN Charter, which 
implied that the principle of self-determination from then on was to be perceived as a human right 
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under international law1 (General Assembly resolution 2625). Consequentially, the right for self-
determination was no longer an entitlement exclusively for post-colonial states, but a human right 
for all people (Vidmar 2012: 544). At that time, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had no 
seat in the United Nations, after the US-supported Kuomintang (KMT) had fled China’s mainland 
for Taiwan in 1949 when the Communist Party of Mao Zedong had won the Chinese Civil war. 
Therefore, the PRC could only disagree and protest from a distance with the newly adopted 
resolution, including its so-called ‘fundamental principle’ of self-determination for all. The KMT 
had renamed Taiwan the Republic of China, which already had had a seat in the UN before the 
war. Backed by the US, it claimed to be the only legitimate government of China after the war, 
despite the fact that the PRC already ruled over China’s mainland by then. Not surprisingly, when 
the PRC eventually became a member of the UN in 1971, taking over the former seat of the ROC 
a year after the declaration was signed, it quietly agreed upon the Friendly Relations Declaration 
as only being legitimate in cases of self-determination after colonial subjugation, the argument 
being that, the declaration was written in the historical context of decolonization (ICJ 2009). In 
addition, the final paragraph of the declaration underlined the importance of sovereignty, which 
would function as a political disclaimer for China from there on.2 
  Claiming the right for self-determination or independence are however not the end of a 
successful secession process. To be just ‘independent’ is not an entitlement under international 
law (Vidmar 2012, p. 544-545). It is the notion of a state according to the Westphalian state 
principles –which are still embedded in the international system- that remains the highest ultimate 
authority in the international system (Silva 2014, p. 13). How to define a state, has been agreed 
upon in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, during the Seventh                                                         1 Source: Friendly Relations Declaration. 
[…] “By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status 
and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right 
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.” […] 
[…]“The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an 
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes 
of implementing the right of self-determination by that people”[…]  
[…] “Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the 
elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their 
actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-
determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter”[…] 2 […] “Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.”[…] 
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International Conference of American States in 1933.3 Article 3 of the convention, known as the 
declarative theory of statehood, stated –much like the later UN Charter- that political existence of 
a state was independent of recognition by other states (Montevideo Convention, 1933, Article 1-
16). However, according to the historically far longer institutionalized constitutive theory of 
statehood 4, a state becomes a legal person once other states recognize it as such (Kreuter 2010, p. 
366). Diplomatic external recognition is thus fundamental to become a legal state in the modern 
state system (Rich 2009, p. 159).  
  However, there are different forms of secessionism to which the international rules apply 
on different levels. Kreuter (2010, p. 370-371) summarizes these different forms or methods of 
secession as follows: 
1. The first method is the use of domestic law to secure secession. This is also known as bilateral 
secessionism. It is a clear expression of democratic will by those wishing to secede, which is 
answered through peaceful negotiations between the secessionists and the parent country. This 
form of secessionism is often answered by international recognition. Unfortunately, in reality, in 
many cases the parent state is not willing to negotiate the wish for independence. And so, bilateral 
secessionism is often simply impossible due to conflicting opinions and sometimes even violent 
situations. Therefore, many secessionist movements have not been recognized by the international 
community and have encountered international condemnation and even diplomatic and military 
interventions opposing their aim (Christopher 2011, p. 126).  
2. A second method of secessionism is unilateral secession. This form is justified when those 
wishing to secede are “a people”, when they were subject to serious violations of human rights at 
the hands of the parent state, and when no other remedies were available to them. Here, the 
recognition of the secessionist case clearly relies on a more moral consideration (Rubin 2000). In 
a way, the state of Israel could be an example of this. 
3. One can also speak of simple declarations of independence. This can occur without 
negotiations or without the blessing of the parent state. Such de facto secession is the most 
difficult to justify in the international arena. The only possibility for justification in that situation 
occurs through recognition of the secessionist state by other nations. However, external 
recognition in this case is often more politically motivated than it is legally supported, since no 
legal framework applies to the undermining of a sovereign country (Kreuter 2010, p. 372).                                                          3 The four basic legal prerequisites necessary for statehood were described in Article 1: (1) A permanent 
population, (2) a clearly defined territory, (3) a government, and (4) the capacity to engage in relations with 
other states (Eggers, 2007, p. 214). 4 Recognized by 39 European sovereign states during the Congress of Vienna in 1815. 
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2.1.1 China’s domestic situation 
When China became a member of the UN in 1971, it ensured its newly gained recognition and 
prohibited the recognition of Taiwan by confining all UN Members to acknowledge the ‘One 
China’ principle. This implies recognizing the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate 
government of China and recognizing Taiwan as a province of China (Zou 2005; Williams 1998). 
It is plausible that China’s sensitivity towards self-determination and the recognition of secession 
thus originally stems from its struggle for its own international recognition between 1949 and 
1971. However, many argue that its domestic issues with separatist regions in Xinjiang and Tibet 
were and still are a great motivation for its rigid and negative stance towards secessionism as well 
(Alden 2007; Zhu and Blachford 2005).  
  Xinjiang, the most vast province in China’s North East has been concurred by the Chinese 
in 1945 for different geopolitical reasons (Bovingdon 2010, p. 11; Ong 2005). Currently, the 
region is principally in the news for the terrorist attacks that are conducted by separatist Turkish 
Uyghurs. Due to the increasing population of Han Chinese moving into the area, which was 
originally inhabited by Uyghur people, and the strict rule by the Chinese government and its harsh 
treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang, many Uyghur feel oppressed and discriminated for their ethnic 
background. This has lead to a somewhat unorganized movement within the Uyghur population 
that aspires an Uyghur nation, independent from China. Most Uyghur aspire a peaceful secession, 
whereas just a small younger group put their hopes in gaining independence through more violent 
acts. Both the Uyghurs themselves as the Chinese government thus condemn these attacks (Yee 
2003; Bovingdon 2010). 
  As for the Tibetans, who were independent from China until the end of Chinese civil war 
in 1950, similar cultural and religious differences lead to violent oppression,5 destruction of 
monasteries, including a ban of Buddhist religion and of Tibetan cultural values. Zhu and 
Blachford (2005, p. 247-249) underline that for both these cases, next to the secessionist 
aspirations, the attributes and distinctive elements of the ethnic groups such as their internally 
homogenous cultures, languages and traditions, enforce the perceptual threat to the central 
Chinese government. Since the Dalai Lama, leader of the Tibetan Buddhists, has always answered 
this oppression with peaceful non-violent protest since the 1960s, China has been heavily 
criticized in the international arena for its violations of human law. For this, China responded by 
stating that the issue of human rights is an internal affair of a country, which should be addressed 
only by the government of that country. In addition, it very much promotes common ground and 
promotes claims of inclusivity as a tactic to curb negative attitudes. Both Xinjiang and Tibet are 
now part of “the great family of the Chinese nation” (Bovingdon 2010, p. 45). China has been                                                         
5 The Lhasa uprising in 1959 had an estimated 86.000 casualties. 
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implementing special policies in both ethnic regions; enforcing both Tibet and Uyghurs to work 
together with Han Chinese in local autonomous government cadres. 
  Meanwhile, since 2005, China has also faced considerably more difficulties with the 
political “secession” of Taiwan. As a reaction to the government in Taiwan, which is increasing 
its pressure and determination to secede officially from the mainland, the PRC enforced an 
unprecedented Anti-Secession law in 2005, directed against Taiwan. This would make Taiwan’s 
further efforts to secede from China, not possible under PRC’s law (Zou, 2005). China has 
namely stated that it will use military force to prevent Taiwanese independence, as this is included 
in the anti-Secession law (Posner and Yoo 2006, p. 3). 
  Prior cases of domestic secession may illustrate that China’s recognition of a seceded state 
is eminently a politically sensitive consideration, which China backs with its own interpretation of 
relevant legislation (Mancini 2008, in Christopher 2011, p. 127; Kreuter 2010). China’s most 
radical answer to its domestic secession regions is making secessionism illegal by constitution. 
However, as the UN Charter is a very relevant international legislation that also applies to China’s 
domestic situation, as well as for secessionist cases abroad, the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: China’s attitude towards secessionist cases abroad is influenced by its stance 
towards the Friendly Relations Declaration of the UN Charter. 
 
2.1.2 Principles under discussion 
Previous cases of China’s domestic secessionist movements are thus believed to influence China’s 
foreign policy in relation to secessionism. Despite the fact that China’s foreign policy 
formulations remain opaque, it holds on to guiding rules called the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence’. These principles were originally formulated to solve a trade dispute in the Tibet 
area in 1954, and consequentially became the guidelines for Beijing’s relations with India (Taylor 
2006, p. 68). But by the 1970s these principles were applied to China’s relations with all states. 
They foremostly stress the importance of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference.6   
  Despite the fact that these principles are addressed as cornerstone policy, they are under                                                         6 
(1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,  
(2) Mutual non-aggression,  
(3) Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,  
(4) Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and lastly  
(5) Peaceful co-existence.   
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constant discussion within China’s domestic discourse when applied to the question whether 
China should become engaged in international affairs and to what extent China has a 
responsibility in the international arena. Shambaugh (2011) distinguishes seven different lines of 
thought that have emerged in the discussion during recent decades, which are: the Nativists, 
Realists, Major Powers, Asia First, Global South, Selective Mulitlateralists, and Globalists. 
China’s Nativists for example distrust international institutions and think China should withdraw 
itself from many of them in order to preserve China’s identity. The Globalist school on the other 
hand of the spectrum, believes China should cooperate and contribute to global issues just like 
other major powers. This dynamic discourse mainly takes place on the Internet amongst Chinese 
netizens. Despite the fact that most foreign policy decisions are made without taking into account 
this public opinion, Chinese officials know that dissatisfaction amongst the public can instigate 
critic on the Party’s ability to rule (Jakobsen and Knox, (2012, p. vii). In fact, it has happened 
several times that leaders were constrained in their actions by the public when issues related to 
Taiwan and Tibet came under international attention.  
  However, not only unofficial circles, but also semi-officials (who?) and official circles are 
actively debating China’s new opportunities, risks and responsibilities. China’s short- and long-
term policies have never been a product of one specific model, but always have been formed by 
compromises amongst elites, bureaucrats, and interest groups (Kennedy 2010). However, on a 
government level, China’s official policy lines through which foreign policy were always 
conducted have become even more fractured. Initially, the nine-member Politburo Standing 
Committee was perceived as the highest decision-making organ of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) in relation to foreign policy. However, its agenda and deliberations are not made public 
and neither do they have an official policy portfolio, which makes every new agenda point subject 
to different interested actors (Jakobsen and Knox 2012, p. 15). This has instigated an increasing, 
new voice of the re-emerging People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which propagates the need for a 
more aggressive stance to protect China’s interests (Jakobsen and Knox, 2012, p. vii).  
  Shambaugh (2011) calls this the realist front or realist school of thought, which is the most 
popular and widespread voice or school of thought within China’s domestic discourse today. 
Realism is deeply rooted in China’s way of thinking. Like other realists, they regard the nation-
state as the unit of analysis and they reject all arguments that challenge the transcendence of 
national borders. State sovereignty is considered sacred. Moreover, Western arguments that China 
should be more involved in global management are perceived as a pitfall in which China has to 
give up a share of its resources and potentially even slow down the pace of its growth. Although 
the Realists are pessimistic about China’s external engagements, they also do not want China to 
be isolated; just clearly defined national interests, as a domestic issue to be protected.  
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In other words, as granting diplomatic recognition is more a political consideration in the case of 
unilateral secessionism, it thus depends to what extent a nation believes that countries can 
interfere in other countries’ businesses; and, to what extent state sovereignty is an 
unchallengeable concept. China’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ and the dynamic 
domestic discourse related to these principles are important indicators for China’s stance towards 
sovereignty, and indirectly for its stance towards secessionism. Also, China’s more Realistic way 
of approaching its foreign relations, with an increasing ‘hard-line realist’ voice from the PLA, 
may change its prerequisites of granting official recognition or not.  
Hypothesis 2: China’s attitude towards secessionism is indirectly influenced by its principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference. 
 
2.2 China’s role in Africa  
2.2.1 History 
At present-day China can be seen as a donor, a market, a financer, an investor, a contractor and a 
builder to many sub-Saharan countries. This is the result of a gradual increase in mutual interests 
that started in the 1950s, a few years after Mao Zedong came to power. As the political troubles 
with Taiwan -that claimed its secession from China’s mainland in 1949- were fairly recent, the 
first formal relations between the PRC and various African countries were established to promote 
and gain diplomatic recognition for the principle of ‘One China’. In addition, China already began 
to spread the concept of a multipolar world by presenting itself as being part of the non-aligned 
developing world during the first Asian-African conference at Bandung, Indonesia (Tull 2006, p. 
467; Strauss 2009). After the first cracks in the Sino-Soviet relation in 1956 over differences in 
the interpretation of Marxism, which eventually led to the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, this concept 
would gradually become more important. 
  During the first major tour to Africa in 1963, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai visited various 
countries to promote China-Africa relations, including Sudan and Somalia. At the time, China 
mainly focussed on movements that fought for independence and that engaged in anti-colonial 
activities (Gill and Reilly 2007, p. 37; van Dijk 2009, p. 9). During the state visits, Zhou 
addressed aspects of China’s foreign policy that still apply to it today: respect for state 
sovereignty, friendly relations grounded on equality, support for anti-colonial movements, non-
conditional development assistance and support of self reliance (Strauss 2009, p. 781-782). At the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China heavily started to promote Maoism, as a turn 
against the post-Stalin Soviet Union, and as an ideological foreign policy in Africa. However, 
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Maoism was not taken well amongst most African leaders, who feared losing their positions as a 
consequence. Maoist ideology namely heavily preached for taking a critical stance towards rulers, 
to the point of fighting for the removal of incompetent ones. Furthermore, Maoism promoted the 
building up of a strong working class, which in most parts of Africa was completely absent. 
However, due to the lack of positive response from African leaders, and the contradiction of 
propagating Maoism as an “exporting revolution” with the principle of non-interference in 
international affairs, China ended the Maoist diplomacy during the late 1960s. Instead, China 
started to provide aid to Africa that was free and unconditional and more often started to support 
socialist regimes (Van Dijk 2009, p. 9). This ending of the critical Maoist diplomacy into an 
ideology-free diplomacy gradually recovered the majority of African bilateral relations (Li 2007, 
p. 91), and would become the glue in the structure of bilateral involvement of China’s official and 
semi-official coverage of China-African affairs in later decades. Although China’s diplomatic 
tone would never lose the initial Maoist rhetoric entirely, as Strauss (2009, p. 779) points out in 
his research on China’s rhetoric and diplomacy.  
 In the post-Mao era in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders tried to 
make it their first priority to recover and modernise the Chinese economy and to gradually 
maximise access to foreign markets (Mohan and Power 2008, p. 30; Zhang 2012). While China 
implemented the adjunct ‘Opening Up’ and ‘Reform’ policies, many African states gained 
independence from their former colonial superpowers. Since both China and the newborn African 
countries focussed primarily on their own independent political development, bilateral relations 
mostly relied on mutual political support, with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism at its 
diplomatic core (Zhang 2012). However, economic China-African relations were not particularly 
intensified (Tull 2006, p. 462).  
  In the 1980s, when both China’s ‘Opening Up’ and ‘Reform’ policies already started to 
show results, China turned to the industrialised West to gain more knowledge and experience in 
relation to economic development, for which it still had much to learn. And by the end of the Cold 
War, China was working towards a ‘socialist market economy’, a market economy model with 
Chinese characteristics. Or, as the official explanation of the model stated: “A socialist market 
economy is an economy based on socialist public ownership in which the government executes 
macroeconomic regulations and the market fulfils its basic role in the distribution of resources” 
(Yasuo 2003, p. 2). On the basis of this structure, China’s state-owned enterprises were thus 
beginning to gain more importance for China’s economic development path. Additionally, and 
most importantly, China’s foreign policy underwent a transformation into a more active stance to 
establish and emphasize non-Western diplomatic relations outside East Asia. According to Tull 
(2006, p. 460-462) this more outward view and need for allies, had three different reasons.  
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  Firstly, after the aggressive military interventions against the separatist movement in 
Lhasa in 1959, China’s new military aggression against the peaceful pro-democracy protesting 
students in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June 1989 flared up negative reactions and sanctions 
of Western countries aimed at Beijing. These sanctions pushed China towards other allies (Zhu & 
Blachford 2005, p. 244). During the three years after the clashes on Tiananmen Square, Chinese 
foreign minister Qian Qichan paid a visit to 14 African countries to establish new diplomatic 
relations. These new diplomatic ties would function as a shield for Beijing from further Western 
criticism about the government’s reaction to the students’ protest within many multilateral 
organizations, like the UN Security Council, and later the United Nations Commission of Human 
Rights (Tull 2006, p. 467)  
  Secondly, the growing international hegemony of the US in the post-1989 period and the 
changing references to China by US leaders, from ‘strategic partner’ to ‘strategic competitor’, 
contributed to the fact that China started to address the concept of multipolarity even more than 
before. This worldview aspires a stable distribution of power in which more than two nation states 
have an equal amount of cultural, military and economic power and international influence. 
Within this paradigm, China perceived itself to become one of the power poles, next to the US 
and Japan (Yasuo 2003, p. 30).  
 The third reason for the expansion of diplomatic ties with Africa was the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. The Chinese leadership realized that China’s domestic situation, including its social 
tensions and the established monopoly of the Communist Party, was also subject and vulnerable 
to external influences. This urged Beijing to diversify its trade relations and become more 
independent from external economic shocks within the Asian region. And so, a year later, the 
Chinese government and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade introduced 
China’s new ‘Going Out Strategy’ (van Dijk 2009, p. 17). This policy push generated support for 
Chinese companies and State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) to expand their businesses to 
international markets. This would create a more steady pace for economic development. But it 
also intensified China’s diplomatic advances towards different countries in the world, including 
the ones located in the sub-Saharan African region.  
  However, many experts in the field state that the expansion towards sub-Saharan Africa 
was part of China’s realistic geo-economic strategy and mostly focussed on investments that 
secured long-term access to natural resources (Economy, 2010, p. 145-147; Gill and Reilly 2007, 
p. 38; Tull 2006, p. 465; Large 2009). In 1998, president Jiang Zemin and the Chinese Ministry of 
Defence declared that energy security had to become the main focus for China’s overall security 
position. China’s increasingly wealthy population, its urbanization, and the many industries 
within its rapidly growing economy, asked for more natural resources, mainly crude oil, than 
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China could provide for itself. Moreover, at the time, global energy politics already became more 
intense and competitive. As a result, many Chinese state owned oil companies then started to 
increase their oil import by securing new oil markets (Mohan and Power 2008; Tull 2006; Alden 
and Hughes 2009). 
   Nevertheless, there were more reasons for China to be involved in Africa, aside from its 
search for natural resources. Africa is not only an exporter of natural resources; it also has become 
a good sales market for Chinese products (Eisenman 2012, p. 800). In the last two decades China 
produced most of the world’s low-tech and low-priced products in local state-built economies of 
scale. Large Chinese “boomtowns”, specializing in mass-producing just one or two different 
products have made Chinese products highly competitive in the world market. Although much of 
China’s capital flows (Figure 1) are not disclosed publicly, estimates are that the capital going 
into Africa has grown 400% from in 2007, since 1991.  
Figure 1. China’s capital flows by region over time (US dollars billion) 
 
Source: Van Dijk (2009) 
2.2.2 Current situation 
Since 2000, further political and economic integration between China and African countries was 
further boosted with frequent high-level reciprocal visits, and has intensified through the 
establishment of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which is held every third 
year since 2000 (Zhang 2012). Receiving a great deal of coverage in the media, this platform 
facilitates collective political dialogue and win-win solutions that stimulate economic cooperation 
between 51 African countries and China. New important topics that improve China-African 
relations are big infrastructural projects, promotion of Chinese private enterprises presented as 
partners of China’s development and investment goals for Africa, cancellation of debts, setting up 
of special economic zones, and the setting up of an Africa development fund (Strauss 2009, p. 
791). In 2005, an African Chamber of Commerce was established in Beijing. And at the Beijing 
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Summit of Forum on FOCAC in 2006, China released a White Paper on its Africa Policy in which 
it expressed to aspire the development of more friendly relations and cooperation with African 
countries based on the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’. Hu Jintao called this a “new 
type of strategic partnership” (Alden and Hughes 2009, p. 564, 565).  
 With the ‘Going out’ strategy still in force today, China currently tries to maintain 
embassies in every African country to support its Chinese companies, apart from the six countries 
that have ties with Taiwan (Tull 2006, p. 462). The main function of these embassies is to guide 
Chinese businesses in their pursuit of entering the African economy. China’s government controls 
many of these corporations; and so China’s national interests are plausibly factored into the 
business strategy. Whether it is this government-controlled structure, or China’s indifference to 
human rights abuses (both forms of illiberal capitalism), China-African economic engagements 
are increasing (Taylor 2006; Alden 2007). Sino African trade volume increased from $12 Million 
in 1950, to $200 Billion in 2012 (Zhang 2012). And China’s investments have grown 
exponentially (Appendix 1). And most of the African oil that was imported by China in 2006 
came from two African niche markets; one of which was Sudan (Tull 2006: 479). And, since 
2009, China has become Africa’s largest trading partner. 
  China’s trade with African countries is often only part of the deal. China provides most 
African countries also with unconditional aid to establish good relations. Despite political and 
social tensions and escalations in various African countries, China assists African countries with 
their development through three different forms of aid: grants, soft loans, and debt relief (van Dijk 
2009, p. 15). China’s grants and soft loans are facilitated by two government-controlled banks, 
namely: the Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank), and China’s Development Bank (CDB). The Exim 
Bank primarily focuses on expanding Chinese trade. Whereas the CDB, which has more assets 
than the World Bank; the Asian Development Bank; and the African Development Bank 
combined, promotes Chinese economic and infrastructure development (Jakobson and Brix 2012, 
p. 28).  
  China’s grants often come in the form of construction works and infrastructure projects 
that are carried out by Chinese companies, and thus financed by the CDB. The first project in 
Africa in the 1970s was a 1,860km railway track from Tanzania to Zambia. Later came hospitals 
in Luanda, Angola; sport stadiums in Benin and Sierra Leone; a water supply project in 
Mauritania; and so on. The loans provided by Exim Bank and the CDB are under the framework 
of the FOCAC and thus have the purpose of broadening the financing channels of African small 
to medium enterprises (CDB Sustainability Report 2012). Although the CDB states that it follows 
market rules, these loans are known for their below-market rate interests, long repayment periods, 
or refund in the form of a lucrative trade deal. Lastly, China has helped many African countries 
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with debt relief; diminishing the debt that was built up throughout the years via state loans. This 
enforces China’s motive of being a partner in development.  
  Although China’s aid is far from the amounts that Western nations provide African states, 
in comparison to Western aid, it comes with very few moral or political strings attached. China 
sticks to the principle of national sovereignty, and therefore does not impose other political 
attachments to its aid, like the anti-corruption measures that Western nations often use as 
prerequisites. African leaders have found that China’s support and critique on Western 
interference in other states’ domestic politics, has generated leeway to diminish the pressures of 
the West on the liberalisation of their political systems (Tull 2006, p. 461). According to the US 
and many international organs, China is thus ignoring corruption and breaches in human rights 
and is only pursuing its economic aims. Therefore, China does not contribute to gradual economic 
development in these African nations and does not take enough responsibility.  
  Mohan and Power (2008, p. 70), among others, call the Chinese involvement in Africa 
ambivalent for this reason (Large 2009; Alden 2009). This unconditional aid and China’s non-
interference policy however, could not only lead to the so called ‘resource curse’ in oil-rich 
countries, which staggers development in the country and favours the status quo, it could 
indirectly lead to risky situations where Chinese corporations and SOE’s are working in unstable 
and even dangerous situations (Jensen & Wantchekon 2004). Although Beijing does not want to 
interfere with other countries’ businesses, the Chinese government might have less choice in the 
future. The more it invests in unstable African countries or rogue states, the more China might 
want to protect its own assets and investments and thus might have to take more responsibility.  
Hypothesis 3: China’s recognition of South Sudan and not of Somaliland is subject to China’s 
political and economical interests in its bilateral relations, which are increasingly economically 
motivated.  
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2.3 China’s peaceful rise 
“Rich countries assume a huge responsibility. […] The more successful development China 
achieves, the more people expect China to reach out to help those small or poor countries and 
deal with difficulties with them. In the same manner, as China gains higher status geopolitically, 
her share of responsibility in world security shall increase as well.” 
Koffi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (Yan  
2006, p. 7) 
China’s international power image has risen considerably in the last few decades, partially due to 
the promotion of its fast economic development. However, China’s perception on normative 
power and the related idea of soft power differs from that of the West. China finds that normative 
power is related to cultural soft power and not to cultural norms that apply to quality of authority. 
Where the West focuses on good governance, human rights and democratic values, China focuses 
on modernisation. Where the UNSC follows the legislation of the International Court of Justice as 
the highest legal organ in the world, China has refused to submit to ICJ’s jurisdiction or even 
appear before it for a long time (Posner and Yoo 2006, p. 7).7 China believes that the ICJ is biased 
in favour of the US; therefore China does not feel itself bound to Western interpretations on the 
rules of the UN Charter. However, due to China’s rising power status, cooperation and interplay 
with other nations may determine or influence its stance towards some foreign policy issues. The 
question thus sets to what extent the international arena may influence China’s attitude towards 
secessionism. Russia however, shares with China its distrust in relation to the aforementioned 
international organs. Considering both countries’ ideological background, we can assume Russia 
may have an influence on China’s future decisions in the international arena. 
  Posner and Yoo (2006, p. 7) overly state that, so far, China and the US have taken 
different sides in every war in the hope of containing a new ally in their rivalry. However, Kerr 
and Xu (2014) argue that the different notions of normative power between East and West might 
be gradually converging in relation to security issues. An important difference in approaching 
security issues lies in the fact that China has always adhered to the norms of sovereignty, non-
interference and territorial integrity, which on their turn might undermine Western efforts and 
which lacks a feeling for responsibility outside domestic borders. But there are other differences: 
Western countries or organizations are more focussed on normative interventions when it comes 
to security situations. China on the other hand pays attention to views of regional organizations                                                         7 China supports the principles of the ICJ, when individuals are brought to justice over violations of human rights. However, it has argued that no-one has the right to challenge the sovereignty and immunity of a head of state. Source: (Attree 2012, p. 18) 
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and grants these organizations more responsibility to solve the problem, before positioning itself. 
This may be enforced by the fact that Africa’s bargaining power is increasing as well. China 
exports technology and helps to build Africa country’s necessary infrastructure for self-sustaining 
economic development, following the ‘China Model’8 (Eisenman 2012, p. 801). However, Zhang 
(2014) explains that Africa’s growing influence is also translating in recovery of other bilateral 
relations, which could marginalize China’s role in Africa in the future. In some cases, it is 
therefore necessary for China to take other bilateral relations and other powers into account while 
choosing its political stance. However, relevant actors and attached relations differ from state to 
state. 
However, simultaneously, during the last decade China has become too powerful to be offended.  
China’s relative growth in comparison to the US raises concerns, since the economic growth 
makes it possible for China to spend more on its defence. And global analysts identify Chinese 
goals to be increasingly prone to constrain Taiwan from independence with a hard realist 
approach (Posner and Yoo 2006, p. 5). At the same time, no country wants to risk its economic 
relations with China over moral disagreements. This might have an influence on how China 
reacted on secession, a sensitive subject, at different moments in time. During Somaliland’s 
secession China was not yet perceived as the new global superpower, but during South Sudan’s 
secession it increasingly was. Therefore the following hypothesis is followed: 
Hypothesis 4: China’s stance towards secessionism is influenced by its growing power in the 
international arena. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        8 China sets its development model as an example for other development nations. 
 20 
 
3. Methodology and Research design 
 
To illustrate whether the prior findings on China’s position on secessionism in general have been 
consistent and have remained consistent over time in different cases of foreign secessionism, light 
will be shed on two separate yet very similar separatist cases in Africa: Somaliland and South 
Sudan. China has never recognized Somaliland, which declared its independence in 1991, but it 
has formally recognized South Sudan in 2011.  
 
3.1 Variables 
In this case study the dependent variable is China’s attitude towards secessionism. More 
specifically, the focus will be on China’s recognition of the new government of South Sudan, and 
its refusal to recognize the democratic government in Somaliland that aims to secede from 
Somalia. The independent variables with which these two cases will be compared stem from a 
grounded literature study on both China’s foreign policy and its relations with African countries 
in general, as well as from literature that is specifically focussed on the two analysed African 
regions.  
  The first independent variable is China’s view on secessionism in general. This variable is 
measured by comparing China’s statements about the Friendly Relations Declaration in the UN 
Charter with how both case studies apply to this declaration. Another indicator that could 
contribute to China’s view on both secessions is to what extent China’s domestic issues with 
respect to secession had been subject to international scrutiny at the time of the secession. This 
might explain China’s sensitivity to granting the external recognition or not. 
  The second independent variable that could explain China’s different reaction towards 
South Sudan compared to Somaliland, is how China’s foreign policy principles with respect to 
state sovereignty, non-interference and territorial integrity apply to both secession processes. 
More importantly, China’s actual emulation of these principles in both cases is compared. After 
explaining the chronological process of the secession, both cases will be evaluated on the basis of 
Kreuter’s (2010) typology in which he distinguishes three types of secession. Indicators that are 
part of these types of secession processes are: the nature of the previous relations between the 
parent state and the seceding state (e.g. violations of human rights, fair cooperation, war), which 
thus implies the level of violence that was generated through or before the secession process, 
Further indicators are the use of domestic law that has been used during the secession process 
(e.g. mutual agreements), whether there are any alternative solutions available other than 
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secessionism, and the variety of the ethnic groups within the seceding region. The variety of the 
ethnic groups within the seceding regions could be relevant when their case is similar to one of 
the two problematic ethnic regions within China itself. The more sensitive the timing, the less 
likely it is that China will interfere in its diplomatic relations with the parent state, at the 
advantage of the secessionist case. Better understanding of the implications of these principles 
might provide more insight into why South Sudan was recognized and Somaliland was not.  
  The third independent variable is China’s political and economical involvement with both 
host- as secessionist-states at the moment that the secessionist movement claimed or attempted to 
reclaim its own territory. Expected is that the higher China’s involvement is, the higher the chance 
that China’s recognition of the secessionist movement could interfere with its relation with the 
parent state, and consequentially could harm its own interests. For the political aspect of China’s 
involvement, indicators are the establishment of important political organs, China’s behaviour 
within important multilateral organizations with respect to the secession, the amount of political 
visits that are paid by official delegations of both countries, and the height of China’s aid, which 
in general is seen as a political catalyst for good business contracts (Alden 2009, p. 569).  
 Furthermore, the relative importance of the mutual trade in both regions will be measured 
with economic indicators such as official trade statistics. Some authors argue that the intensity of 
China-Africa bilateral economic and political relations are far more heavily dependent on the type 
of products that are being exchanged, rather than the similarity of the political structure of both 
countries (Eisenman 2012, p. 794, 795). Some types of products like raw materials or arms, are 
considered more important than others, like manufactured consumer goods or capital equipment. 
To confirm China’s increasing realist behaviour, the fact that China supported South Sudan, and 
not Somaliland will be discussed with respect to the extent to which China benefited or 
contributed to its own future interests in both cases. 
  The last independent variable is the influence of China’s international growing power that 
presumably contributes to China’s changing role towards secessionism. According to Kerr and Xu 
(2014) China’s role in the UNSC is changing due to its normative convergence with respect to 
security situations. This is part of the literature that will be discussed about the normative opinion 
that growing power entails a growing responsibility towards other countries. An indicator for this 
variable is how proactively China reacts to the situations in both secession cases, politically and 
military. However for a weighted judgement on both cases, literature that spills a more negative 
view on China’s presence in Africa will also be addressed. This can be traced back through 
China’s attitude towards (and engagement in-) different institutions like the African Union, the 
UNSC, and the FOCAC. 
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  Research design 
The following case studies will address China’s position on the secessionist initiatives of 
Somaliland and South Sudan. For this, current literature on the history and political affairs of both 
countries will be used to create a chronology of events, but also to gain more understanding of the 
process of secession within these countries and China’s economical and political involvement 
there. To replicate logic to establish external validity, the same hypotheses and theory will be 
applied for both cases. 
  Case selection  
According to Mill’s “method of difference” it is a key challenge to find cases that are as similar as 
possible, but that differ in their outcomes for they have all but one different independent variable. 
The cases of South Sudan and Somaliland have many similarities including, their relatively recent 
gain and loss of autonomy, their British colonial past, and their geographical position, but most 
importantly their (aspired) secession from another state after suppression and war. Aside from 
this, the outcomes of both cases differ, as one case has been recognized by China, while the other 
has not. Since there are also many differences between the two cases, it is not a perfect example 
of cross-case comparison. However, as this is never possible for case comparison in the field of 
political science, the second challenge is to demonstrate that the difference in the value of the 
independent variable of interest between the two cases is the one accounting for the difference in 
outcomes, rather than the residual differences between the two cases identified by rival 
hypotheses.  
  An important difference between the two cases is the timeframe during which both 
secessionist regions aimed to secede and asked for recognition from the international arena. 
Somaliland tried to become independent from 1991 onwards, whereas South Sudan officially 
made its first efforts in 2005. In the meantime change may have occurred respect to the prior 
mentioned independent variables used to compare the two secession cases. Therefore, a 
chronological order of events will be attained, meaning Somaliland will be discussed first, 
followed by South Sudan.  
  Data collection & Methods 
The key method for the comparison of two similar cases is process tracing, which will be used in 
this case study. To compare the two cases, an inductive method will be used by testing the prior 
formulated hypotheses against findings retrieved from the scientific political theory literature and 
relevant primary or statistical data. Most of the independent variables in relation to the secession 
process will be measured with help from secondary sources such as the general political science 
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and international law literature, as well as economic and diplomatic reports (mainly online 
through e.g. embassy’s websites).  
  To obtain a clear view of China’s attitude towards secessionism in general official 
statements will be used that can be retrieved from different organizations or news sources on the 
Internet. One of the primary sources in which China’ expresses its attitude towards secessionism, 
will be a court hearing of the International Court of Justice from 2009. In addition, general 
literature about China’s foreign policies and domestic secessionist issues will be used. Since both 
are extremely sensitive subjects for Beijing, most of the literature stems from Western experts in 
the field. However, it seems that China’s International legal scholars have more freedom of 
expression than their political science counterparts. According to Kim (1987: 7) this is due to the 
fact that International law is seen as an instrument for International Relations or International 
politics. As a consequence, international law is a less sensitive perspective for Chinese scholars to 
discuss China’s foreign policy. This is also why a relatively large portion of the chosen literature 
is related to international law. As the first two hypotheses theoretically highly intertwine and both 
apply to the aforementioned data, they will be discussed in a common chapter in the case study. 
  China’s political and economical involvement within the two cases will further be 
analyzed using official statements from key Chinese institutes that are involved in China’s 
activities in Africa, such as the FOCAC, relevant ministries of foreign affairs, relevant trade 
organizations, China’s embassies, and as an example, China’s Development Bank. In addition, 
reports of relevant NGO’s in the field may provide more details. For the opaqueness of China’s 
money flows, the height of China’s aid will be measured with available data from AidData, which 
is an open data source that registers China’s aid projects.  
   To measure the influence of China’s growing power with respect to granting recognition 
to a secessionist state, first light will be shed on the international perception of China’s power at 
the time of the secession. In addition, relevant political science theory literature will be advised to 
explain China’s conduct with respect to other nations. Most content that will be advised for the 
case studies will consist of secondary sources, namely relevant political articles, media reports 
and statements on official government websites. 
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4.1 Somaliland  
 
Somaliland is internationally recognized as an autonomous northern state within Somalia. It is 
located in the northern top of the Horn of Africa. Somaliland shares its borders with Ethiopia in 
the south, Djibouti in the north, the Gulf of Aden and the autonomous Puntland region of Somalia 
in the East. Its capital is Hargeisa. The country has three and a half million inhabitants, and covers 
a geographic area of 137,600 square kilometres (Jhazbhay 2003, p. 79). The main religion since 
the 14th century is predominantly Islam. In the middle ages the local clan system evolved when 
extended Islamic families from Arabia fled to Somali regions and economically beneficial 
relationships were established through interethnic marriages with locals. The largest ethnic clan 
today are the Isaaq, but numerous smaller clans are present as well (website: Country Facts, UN 
permanent mission, n.d; website: UNPO, Somaliland, 2008). 
 
 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons (James Dhal, 2014). Available from: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Somalia_map_states_regions_districts.png [28 May 2014] 
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4.1.1 History 
Within a week after Somaliland’s -internationally recognized- independence from Britain in June 
1960, Somaliland decided to join its neighbouring country Somalie, which declared its 
independence from Italy on July 1st. Despite a short political struggle caused by issues over the 
new representation, still motivated by a nationalistic pursuit of a “Greater Somalia”, the territories 
managed to form a new unified and rather peaceful Somali Republic at least its first decade 
(Kreuter 2010, p. 375). However, in October 1969 Somalia’s second president Abdirashid Ali 
Shermarke was assassinated by one of his own bodyguards for reasons unknown. Major General 
Mohamed Siad Barre took advantage of this sudden power vacuum and took power in a bloodless 
and unopposed military coup d’état. Siad Barre was a member of the Marehan Darod Clan, from 
the south west of Somalia. As leader of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), he 
immediately began reforming the country. Firstly, the Somali Republic was renamed in the 
Somali Democratic Republic. The SRC arrested former government officials, banned all political 
parties, and dissolved the Parliament, Supreme Court, and the former constitution. Despite Barre’s 
promises to eradicate tribalism and decentralise power, all the important economical and political 
institutions were planned to be located in the Southern region of the Somali republic, where 
members of his clan could influence and support his rule (Forti 2011, p. 15). This generated great 
political and economical advantages for that region over other more distant regions, like 
Somaliland, which ultimately provoked northern resistance.  
  In an effort to protect the northern clans’ interests, a guerrilla movement was established 
in 1982, named the Somali National Movement (SNM). This movement, or political organization 
mostly consisted out of members of the northern Isaaq peoples (UN permanent mission, n.d.). 
While promoting ‘Somali values of cooperation rather than coercion’, the struggle still escalated 
between May 1988 and March 1989, when the SNM tried to control northern towns through its 
newly established bases. Siad Barre’s government brutally answered the SNM’s achievements by 
flattening out the northern capital Hargeisa and other major cities with artillery, South African 
mercenaries, and a bomber aircraft. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed and more than half 
a million citizens were forced to flee to neighbouring Ethiopia. This escalation was the beginning 
of the Somali Civil war. Soon after the attack on Hargeisa, more opposition against the central 
government emerged from the south. A coalition of two southern-based clans of the Isaaq peoples 
and more armed actors joined the SNM in their efforts, until Mogadishu, the Somali capital, was 
taken over in 1991 and Barre fled the country (Bryden 2004, p. 24). 
  With the collapse of the government and the overthrow of dictator Said Barre in 1991, 
Somaliland declared itself independent for the second time, but now from its former union 
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partner, Somalia (Bryden 2004, p. 23). This was nothing more than a formal revoking of the act of 
union, but it was interpreted differently by international organizations (Jhazbhay 2003, p. 78). 
Especially the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the League of Arab States (LAS) 
opposed Somaliland’s aspirations (Bryden 2004, p. 25). Having no choice, Somaliland started to 
rebuild itself without help from any other nation or organization. A modest economic and 
democratic development, with financial support from the Somaliland diaspora that fled the 
country during the civil war, eventually led to the establishment of a stable democratic society 
with fair elections and even a democratically approved constitution in 2011. At present, on the 
basis of its institutions and its respect to human rights, Somaliland should be able to call itself a 
righteous member of the nation of states (Jhazbay 2003, p. 80). However, to this day Somaliland 
is not recognized officially by any other nation. And so, fair or not, the Somaliland Republic is 
now often typified simultaneously as a ‘break away’ state, and as ‘the African state that could’ 
(Jhazbay 2003, p. 77l Poore, 2009). To better understand China’s position in relation to 
Somaliland’s secession, first the process of secession will be examined. Then, a closer look will 
be given to China’s view on the case. 
 
4.1.2 China’s attitude towards the secession 
During the war against Barre (1988-1991), the Isaaq Somali National Movement (SNM) had 
decided with the two southern fighting fronts, that the Somali Democratic Republic would remain 
unified under a federal system after Said Barre was overthrown (Bryden 2004, p. 22). However, 
when Barre’s government collapse became a feasible prospect, Somaliland’s clan elders and SNM 
senior officials, who had respected positions within Somaliland’s traditional society, started to 
invoke all Somalilanders to end violence and mobilise support for an independent northern 
territory. Already in 1969, when the murder of Somalia’s first president’s was followed by a 
military coup, scepticism emerged amongst Somalilanders towards the viability of their union 
with Somalia. By 1990, this scepticism had further deteriorated because of Somaliland’s ethnic 
underrepresentation in the political structure of the country, an unequal distribution of the 
country’s revenue earned with livestock exports and national resources, and by the suffering of 
ethnic discrimination in the form of clan-based persecution and violence during the bombings on 
Somaliland’s northern cities (Forti 2011, p 17). Many of the fighting Isaaq from the SNM 
believed that their fight was for the eventual independence of Somaliland. For them, the rulers in 
Mogadishu could bring nothing more than discrimination, oppression and genocidal violence 
(Bryden 2004, p. 24). So, when General Barre eventually fell, and months of deliberations in 
major conferences between different parties and segments of society followed to establish peace 
and a ceasefire, the northern separatist lobby was also present.  
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  During the second of two major conferences, respectively in Borama and Bur’o, in which 
a transitional administration for the northwestern regions of Somalia was to be discussed amongst 
traditional Somali leaders, mass demonstrations erupted throughout Isaaq regions. On May 18th 
1991, one day after one of these demonstrations had even entered the building where the 
conference was held, the formal union between Somaliland and Somalia was entirely 
unexpectedly unilaterally revoked. The independence that Somaliland had previously enjoyed for 
five days in 1960 was now suddenly reinstated (Jhazbhay 2003, p. 79). Somalia’s central 
government however was caught up in a war and so did not respond to the secession; in 
anticipation of this response, this also put international responses to the secession on hold, 
including China’s. Moreover, Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence did not fall 
under secession after colonial subjection, a reason for secession that China undoubtedly would 
have supported. Breaking up a self instigated union meant far more complex implications for the 
secession process. China had not signed the Friendly Relations Declaration in 1970 and did not 
support the International Court of Justice in many cases. In contrast with opinions of many other 
UN members, the right to self-determination did not fall under the umbrella of human rights in 
China’s perception and would thus not be answered with political recognition (Zhu and Blachford 
2005, p. 250). This is also leaving aside the missing internal recognition from Somalia’s central 
government that would be necessary for external recognition in case China would have seen the 
right to self-determination as a human right for all peoples. 
  On a political level, Beijing therefore avoided direct comment on the status of Somaliland 
since its unilateral declaration of independence, stating that the issue was an internal affair of 
Somalia. And by this China showed its preferred approach to bilateral relations (Lanteigne 2012, 
p. 293; Zou 2005). In addition, China’s diplomatic ties with Somalia’s government in Mogadishu 
were already established decades before Somaliland’s secession, meaning these ties functioned as 
China’s bilateral starting point. Not recognizing Somaliland at the time was thus also an example 
of China’s boundaries for its perceived responsibility in its foreign policy. Following its ‘Five 
Principles of Coexistence’, China would have to respect Somalia’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, and would therefore not interfere with its domestic affairs, as it is expecting the same 
in return (Taylor 2006, p. 68).  
  In fact, China has nowadays become one of the important voices within the UN to seek 
attention for the increasingly chaotic situation in Somalia. With the international aid this has 
generated, China tries to help Somalia’s central government to regain power within its country 
(Farley 2010). 
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4.1.3 China’s involvement 
China’s involvement in the Somali Republic, prior to Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of 
independence in 1991 was very characteristic for its third-world foreign policies at the time. After 
Stalin’s death, and Nikita Khrushchev’s revisionist denunciation of Stalin’s crimes in 1956, Mao 
chose to take a different and more independent path from then on. China started to support more 
socialist regimes in Africa, one of which was the new Somali’ socialist regime. In the first few 
years after China had established relations with Somalia on December 14th 1960, its foreign policy 
towards Somalia –as for other African countries-was full of Maoist ideology. China needed 
support for the restoration of its seat within the United Nations and tried to spread its influence by 
distributing ideological ideas that had worked domestically. Somalia pursued a foreign policy of 
nonalignment at that time. Therefore, to avoid harming the relationship, China omitted Maoist 
reform ideas in subsequent bilateral dialogues (Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).  
  When Said Barre took power in 1969, China started to promote the idea of China as a 
leader of all developing nations. Having its own history of anti-colonial struggle and 
underdevelopment, and being an ‘old civilisation’ China had a more legitimate reason to 
cooperate with African countries than the west (Strauss 2009, p. 779). The relation with Somalia 
was reinforced by the fact that Said Barre’s political philosophy was already inspired by 
‘Scientific socialism’ during Soviet military trainings, which followed the ideas of Karl Marx. He 
mixed the implementation of this ideological thought with several typical Chinese reforms, such 
as the road-building and the re-education of his people. To improve bilateral relations, China 
started to provide economic assistance and aid in the form of non-military funding for various 
projects (Van Dijk 2009, p. 9; Shambaugh 2011). China’s aid started to bear fruit, and as a formal 
reimbursement for its acquired aid, Somalia submitted a motion to the General Assembly of the 
UN for the restoration of China’s seat in the UN and actively contributed to the needs of the PRC 
within the UN (Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). And as a result, China regained its seat 
in 1971. 
  The relations between China and Somalia in the 1970s can be partially described by how 
the Chinese media reported on an official state visit of Barre to China in Beijing on May 1972. 
During this visit, Premier Zhou Enlai spoke about the struggles against imperialism, colonialism, 
and neo-colonialism, and he mentioned the social progress that was growing throughout the 
world. Siad Barre spoke about the friendly relations between China and Somalia, and he thanked 
the Chinese government for the aid that was given to Somalia and China’s support for the 
liberation movements in Africa and the rest of the third world (Peking Review, 1972, p. 4,5). 
China’s involvement in Somalia during the decades of Siad Barre’s rule seemed to be thriving, 
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and primarily symbolic and politically motivated.  
   In 1974, Somalia became the first African country to establish relations with the Soviet 
Union. In 1976 the Supreme Revolutionary Council transformed itself into the Somali 
Revolutionary Socialist Party, which was a one-party government. However, after having just 
three years of peaceful relations with the Soviets, Said Barre made a great strategic mistake in 
1977. He had thrown Somalia in an unsustainable conflict that was started by his nationalistic aim 
to secure the Ogaden plain in Ethiopia, a cherished aim in the pursuit of a ‘Greater Somalia’ of the 
Somali nationalist movement. However, Ethiopia had recently turned towards Marxism, and 
garnered support from the Soviets. According to Brind (1983: 76) it has been argued that the 
Soviet Union favoured Ethiopia for it was a better base to maintain power in the region. As a 
reaction of Barre’s attack on Ethiopia, the Soviets cut their aid to Somalia and Barre’s 
expansionist aspirations were answered by massive armed support to Ethiopia, by the Soviet 
Union and of Cuba (Mayall 1978, p. 336). Somalia then converted to the anti-Soviet camp, and 
ended the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviets a few months later. Now, Barre had hoped to gain 
US-support instead, but failed to comply with necessary prerequisites for aid. Due to the chaos of 
war, the lack of financial assistance and a following drought, a severe famine and subsequently 
more discontent towards Barre’s government spread in the country. 
  In 1976, after Mao’s death and the Gang of Four was arrested, Deng Xiaoping had started 
to lead China with a less ideological and more economic view. This clearly impacted its foreign 
policy, including its view on bilateral relations. Diplomatic relations would become less 
politically motivated and more focussed on development. Deng Xiaoping even had a less radical 
view on Sino-Soviet relations than Mao had had before. However, the Soviets were no longer 
leading China’s taste of ‘picking friends’ and the multipolar world order was still considered a 
real scenario for the future. Especially after the Soviets’ rejection of Somalia’s regime, it seemed 
to become clear that China was pursuing ideology-free diplomacy and that it found trade relations 
and mutual development to be more important; China took over the aid projects that the Russians 
had left behind (Washington Post, 1978), and more official visits from China to Somalia 
followed.9 Moreover, two ‘Economic and Trade Agreements’ were signed by the two countries in 
1978 and in 1980 on ‘Economic and Technological Cooperation’ and ‘Trade and Payment’, 
respectively. China’s exports to Somalia consisted mainly of light industrial products; textile;                                                         9 Website: FOCAC, Chinese Foreign Ministry, 2006: First Vice President and Defense Minister Mohamed Ali Samater (May 1979), Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre (April 1979, December 1984), Second Vice President Hussein Kulmie Afrah (April 1982). Chinese leaders who visited Somalia: Premier Zhou Enlai, (February 1964, accompanied by Vice Premier Chen Yi), Vice Premier Chen Muhua (July, 1978), Vice Premier Geng Biao, (November 1978), Vice Foreign Minister He Ying (October 1979), and Yang Jingren, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (October 1984), President Li Xiannian (March, 1986). 
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medicine; hardware and small-sized machinery, and China’s main imports from Somali were 
myrrh; frankincense; and leather. Several cultural exchanges and small-scale health care projects 
were arranged as well. And up until the civil war in 1990, China and Somalia even retained 
friendly military relations, which resulted in several military exchanges10. Due to the separatist 
situation in the north, and the various striding and coexisting warlords in central Somalia ruling 
the country after 1991, the Chinese embassy, its medical team and relevant experts left Somalia, 
for safety reasons. Despite the physical absence of Chinese officials, China still maintains 
diplomatic contact with Somalia (FOCAC, Chinese Foreign Ministry 2006).11 
  Online Aiddata, which tracks Chinese aid to Somalia through official media reports, 
showed that, in 2002, a commercial Chinese exploration ship arrived in Berbara, a northern city in 
Somaliland, to search the region for oil. The implementation and the present status of this project 
is however vague, with costs and profits unknown (Coastal Oil Exploration, 2002). Aiddata also 
showed that China has paid an unknown amount of Foreign Direct Investment to Somalia in 2002 
as a means to voice interest in exploring oil fields in Mudug, the central province of Somalia, 
which lies south of Somaliland. The finding is backed by a report from a local news agency in 
Somalia, which states that Britain (BP) is now taking the lead in the bid (Mudugmedia 2012).  
   It is unclear whether China knew there was a possible presence of oil fields in Somalia, 
and whether that might have influenced its perceptions on its bilateral relations with Somalia. In 
addition, it is hard to say whether a Chinese oil corporation is commercial or government driven. 
Many indicators that have been discussed in the methods section have unfortunately been hard to 
find, due to the opaqueness of China-Somalia relations, and the lack of the registration of their 
trade exchanges. The Chinese Foreign Ministry website even states that most of the trade between 
China and Somalia was paid with cash transactions (FOCAC, Chinese Foreign Ministry 2006). 
However, what can be said about China-Somalia relations is that it has been mostly political and 
symbolic, especially around the time of Somaliland’s secession.  
 
 
 
                                                        10 Website: FOCAC, Chinese Foreign Ministry, 2006: Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali of Defense Minister of Somalia in May 1979, Major General Aden Abdullahi Nur in 1988, and Liu Kai, Assistant Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in April 1980.  
11 For support of the statements with respect to Somalia’s export products, no figures could be retrieved from the World Trade Organization, since Somalia is no member.  
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4.1.4 China’s growing power  
Jhazbay (2003, p. 79) and Posner and Yoo (2006, p. 11) argue that Somaliland’s problem lies 
mostly in its geographical size. It is simply too small to garner the right amount of attention to 
gain recognition from foreign countries and organizations. They argue that it is even not important 
enough for a foreign intervention. This might play a part in China’s attitude towards the case. 
Kreuter (2010, p. 372) argues that secessionist movements in less influential nations must also 
gain the approval of a powerful nation in order to gain legitimacy.  It thus depends on the will and 
the motives of one powerful nation to receive more attention and support. However, on May 18th 
1991, when Somaliland declared its independency from Somalia, China was not seen as a big 
influential international power yet (Yan 2006, p. 6). In fact, when Somaliland unilaterally 
declared its independence, China’s international status could have played a part in China’s 
decision of not recognizing Somaliland and remain loyal to Somalia. Just two years earlier, China 
had been under great criticism for its violent military reaction to the student protests on 
Tiananmen Square. China clearly needed support from its existing diplomatic relations within 
multilateral organizations like the UNSC, the WTO and the IMF (Tull 2006, p. 467). As Somalia 
had previously helped to regain China’s seat in the UN at the cost of Taiwan, China could not 
betray this relation for a new state that did not have a seat within the UN or any other international 
organization, setting aside that this would entirely be against China’s foreign policy principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference. Currently, China still supports what is left of Somalia’s central 
government, and has become a big advocate to Somalia’s problems within the UNSC. 
  Moreover, in case of a security emergency, China also pays attention to the views of 
regional bodies before it takes a stance towards the case (Kerr and Xu 2014, p. 2). The relevant 
regional body in this case, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), predecessor of the African 
Union (AU), did not agree on Somaliland’s new terms (Jhazbay 2003, p.75). The OAU was 
established in 1963 as the first supranational organization in Africa to promote the unity of 
African states by creating one African voice. Next to the coordination and intensification of 
cooperation between African states in order to raise living standards of Africans, the OAU was 
there to protect the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of its member states by settling 
arguments between member states with diplomacy and peaceful negotiations. Unfortunately, the 
OAU did not have the means or assets to protect its members’ territories in an active manner 
when disagreement between member states would escalate. Because of this, the former colonial 
borders, despite their often ill-fated placements, became nonnegotiable for their risk of flaring 
more unrest (Murithi 2009, p. 91; Williams 2007). Not unexpectedly, the disagreement between 
the OAU and Somaliland arose over the question whether the official colonial boundaries were set 
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after the act of union between Somaliland and Somalia, or before. According to Somaliland, the 
country did not part from a pre-independence bond with the south, and therefore did not violate 
colonial boundaries, all the more since it was even recognized as an independent state in 1960 
(Jhazbhay 2003, p. 79). However, as the organization was established three years after both 
Somaliland and Somalia gained their independence and had merged together, the OAU had no 
official record of it. The leadership of Somaliland had not explicitly expressed its desire to secede 
from Somalia yet when Somalia became a member of the OAU. 
  At the time, China’s political relation with the OAU was not yet officially established. In 
fact, the African Union was admitted as a full member in the FOCAC in October 2011, yet only 
as an Observer (African Union, n.d.). However, around Somaliland’s secession the organization -
being the highest African multilateral organization- had the potential to become a very important 
actor for Africa, and indirectly also for China’s political and economic relations with African 
member states. China would have put itself in a risky position if it had questioned the OAU’s 
adjudication of the matter. Moreover, interfering with their agenda would resemble previous 
Western ways of cooperation, which did not rhyme with China’s diplomacy of a separate and 
better non-conditional development model than the West had to offer (Strauss 2009, p. 780).  
  Bound by its own problems, it was not China that could have changed the international 
view on Somaliland at the time. The international powers that could have had this influence were 
constrained by the fact that Somaliland’s secession process did not comply with international law. 
Moreover, most of the international attention (around the time of Somaliland’s secession) that was 
directed towards the Horn of Africa was mainly focussing on the civil war; making Somaliland’s 
case of secondary importance. A World Bank project support graph (Appendix 2) and an IMF 
balance (Appendix 3) show that all of the running aid projects were cancelled and put on hold 
when the civil war broke out; despite the relative peace in Somaliland, in which aid projects could 
have worked out as planned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
 4.1.5 Conclusion 
The fact that China still supports Somalia’s government -despite the fact that it is essentially a 
failed state- is in line with the fact that China tends not to support secession movements when the 
secession is not from a former colonial subjection. Furthermore, China supported the former 
Mogadishu-based government of Somalia since the 1970s, having stable bilateral relations. 
Somalia actively helped China to regain its seat within the UNSC, and in return China provided 
unconditional aid (Strauss 2009, p. 780). As the fall of Somalia’s central government was the 
signal for Somaliland to declare itself independent, which made the secession a simple declaration 
of independence and not a bilateral one, recognizing it would mean undermining relations with 
Somalia (Kreuter 2010). China’s ‘Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ made this loyalty towards 
Somalia practically an obligation.  
  In addition, recognizing Somaliland could also have consequences for China’s relations 
with other African counties or official government bodies. From an economic point of view, 
China had strong aspirations to intensify its political and economical relations with all African 
countries. An important way of doing this was by establishing a good relation with the OAU 
(Zhang 2014). As the OAU argued that Somaliland’s secession was illegal, this could have 
influenced China’s perception on the case. Maintaining a credible and steady foreign diplomacy 
was a part of that as Strauss (2009) explained.  
  At present, the chaos the country receded into since 1991 is eminent to the point that it 
prevents China amongst many others to take a stance on the future of Somalia and Somaliland 
(Lalos 2011). Therefore, the secessionist case of Somaliland has remained unresolved to this day. 
Although Somalia’s interim government, the Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) 
expressed to have the same transitional democratic aspirations as Somaliland, but in August 2000 
during a conference in Djibouti it became clear that it still fails to take on its duties or even 
influence the daily affairs of the country (Bryden 2004, p. 28). The TNG only has control in parts 
of Somalia’s capital Mogadishu.  Due to the chaos in the country, larger parts of Somalia are now 
ruled by clans, pirates and are host for terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab, a fundamentalist 
Muslim terror group linked to Al-Qaeda (Kreuter 2010, p. 377). Even despite the fact that 
Somaliland meets all the requirements of international law to become an internationally 
recognized state and that it already has de facto control over its own territory for more than three 
decades independent of Somalia (Rich 2009, p. 162).  
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4.2 South Sudan 
South Sudan is a landlocked state in the north east of Africa. Its current capital is Juba. It shares 
its borders with Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Congo and the Central African Republic. South 
Sudan has approximately 8 to 10 million inhabitants that form multiple ethnic groups: the Dinka, 
the Nuer, the Bari, and the Azande. Among these ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Nuer are the 
largest. After gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan has become an 
internationally recognized country and has become a member of the United Nations and the 
African Union. While southern Sudan has a rich soil and favourable rainfall patterns, the South’s 
historic and political marginalization has resulted in an underdeveloped of the natural resources 
industry (ISS working paper, 2005). 
 
Source: http://ultrarunnergirl.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/map.gif [20 June 2014] 
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4.2.1 History  
The split of territory that Britain had instigated between Egypt and Sudan during their colonial 
rule (1899-1956) had provoked Egyptian nationalists who wanted the British to recognize a 
unified Islamic Egypt and Sudan. When Britain officially left Sudan in 1932, British military 
forces remained in place to protect Sudan for a potential nationalistic invasion from Egypt. 
Meanwhile, during colonial rule, large differences emerged between the north and the south of 
Sudan. And so, shortly before Sudan’s independence in 1956, a civil war between the north and 
the south broke out. The new northern government pursued one single Sudanese nation where it 
had not existed before. During their colonial rule, the Brits had sent Christian missionaries to the 
south, Anglicising most of the education. Sudan’s north remained mostly Muslim and spoke 
Arabic so the country was divided on the basis of ethnicity, language and religion (Christopher 
2011, p. 127). Programs to unify the country through ‘Arabisation’ or ‘Islamicisation’ caused a 
southern reaction for the preservation of their identity. During this civil war, over two million 
people died and many others fled to neighbouring countries. Relative peace only emerged after 
the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) in 1972. This agreement granted the south regional autonomy 
for the first time (Salman, 2011, p. 155).  
  However, when president Nimeiri imposed Shari’ a law over the south for a second time, 
and massively violated human laws and breached the Addis Ababa Agreement in several ways, 
the second civil war erupted in 1983 (Christopher 2011, p. 127). The South responded with the 
foundation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army / Movement (SPLA/SPLM), led by John 
Garang De Mabiorm, they fought for a united, but democratic secular Sudan were all would 
benefit from future socio-economic development (Hutchinson 2001, p. 307). Second in command 
was Salva Kiir, who was more in favour of a south Sudanese secession (Jooma, 2005). In 1989, 
the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Omar al-Bashir gained power in Khartoum, but found no 
other foreign sponsor due to America’s containment policy and international sanctions against its 
repressive behaviour. China saw in Sudan a country full of business opportunities and a future oil 
reserve. Among many other factors, this state of affairs would contribute to China’s role in later 
developments of the Sudanese conflict (Large 2009, p. 611). 
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4.2.2 China’s attitude towards the secession  
In the decade before South Sudan’s declaration of independence, China had shown a strong stance 
against secessionism twice. In 2005 China adopted a rare domestic Anti-Secession law, which 
meant for Taiwan that its separatist notions not only politically but also legally conflicted with 
Beijing’s view on the island (Zou 2005). And in 2009, only a few years before the official 
referendum was held for South Sudan’s independence, China had made a strong stance against the 
secession of Kosovo from Serbia, by taking its arguments to the International Court of Justice12 
(ICJ). Many state that China’s anti-secession view was more explainable by China’s perceived 
threat of its domestic secessionist cases, than its stance towards the importance of domestic non-
interference in general (Alden 2007). Enforcing this assumption was China’s quick shut down of 
all discussions applying Kosovo’s secession to Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan (Jamar and Vigness 
2010, p. 919).  
  However, next to explaining its stance against the former adopted right of self-
determination for all people, China’s official counterarguments in the case of Kosovo particularly 
articulated its stance against domestic interference (Vidmar 2012, p.544). With Resolution 1244, 
which China had objected in the UNSC, the UN had legitimized an interim government and a 
NATO intervention in Kosovo, which would later facilitate Kosovo’s independence. China’s main 
concern was this military intervention and that the former resolution between Yugoslavia and 
Kosovo had purely envisioned the UNSC’s support in a fair political process; and not taking the 
lead in relation to the process’ outcome or the future status of Kosovo as a sovereign nation. 
Moreover, China also denoted that the legal status of Kosovo’s secession was actually illegal by 
international law, since Serbia and Yugoslavia, being the parent states, did not agree with the 
unilateral declaration of independence and a secession would mean a violation of its territorial 
integrity. Furthermore, China argued that “remedial self-determination” like the secession of 
Kosovo, should not be an exception to this principle (ICJ Advisory Opinion 2009, CR 29). As 
both Kosovo and South Sudan were under foreign supervision and gained independence from 
their parent state (and not from a former colonial state) through ‘remedial self-determination’, 
following expectations, China should have made its arguments against Kosovo’s case count for 
South Sudan’s secession in 2011.  
  However, South Sudan’s secession process also differed from Kosovo’s secession in many 
ways. Negotiations between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and the 
Central Government of the Republic of Sudan (GoS) had started to gain ground, after the Inter                                                         12 Public sitting on Resolution 1244: ‘the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo’, 7 Decembre 2009, Ambassador 
Xue Hanqin 
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Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had stepped up as a mediator in 1994. The 
IGAD is an international organization for economic cooperation consisting out of delegations of 
neighbouring East African countries13 (Jooma, 2005). It would mediate the negotiations until the 
implementation of the final CPA together with the US, Norway and the UK as observer states. 
The first basic agreements were signed in 2002 in Machakos, Kenya (Johnson 2008, p. 8). Both 
parties were aware of the lengthiness and the casualties of the war and signed the Machakos 
Protocol after one-and-a-half month of negotiations on the terms, the transition process and even 
the right to self-determination of the south.  
  The agreed principles comprised the right for the Southern Sudanese to control and govern 
affairs in their region, and equal participation in the National Government, the right to self-
determination through a referendum determining South Sudan’s future status at the end of the 
interim period, and further cooperation on: a fair democratic system that would serve the needs of 
its people in terms of social, political and economic justice; negotiations and implementation of a 
ceasefire to end the suffering of the Sudanese people; a development plan to address the needs of 
the Sudanese people; and a design to make the unification an attractive prospect for the southern 
Sudanese. The transition process was formulated as a six months pre-interim period in which the 
institutions, the mechanisms, the monitoring and international assistance would be established to 
make the Peace Agreement and the referendum at the end of the interim-period possible. Next to 
that, agreements on freedom of religion, customs and beliefs and on the new infrastructure of the 
government were signed. Lastly, the structure for the referendum, the pre-transition period and the 
relevant monitoring actors involved were agreed upon as well (Machakos Protocol (CPA) 2005).  
  Further following important protocols for the CPA, related to ‘security arrangements’; 
‘wealth-sharing’; ‘power-sharing’; and resolutions on several conflict areas were signed in 2003 
and 2004 (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005). The oil infrastructure of pipelines, refineries, 
and export facilities were all located in the north of Sudan, and so extensive negotiations – 
interrupted more than once over disagreements- for the CPA were directed towards this problem. 
Both regions namely heavily relied on this source of income (United Nations Mission in Sudan, 
n.d.). Eventually, in January 2005 the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 
contained the main clauses of the CPA, such as the governance principles and institutions that 
would set in during the following 6-year interim period (Salman 2011, p. 154). One could say that 
the nature of relations between the two parties was thus simultaneously hostile, yet cooperative, 
constructing domestic law in the interest of future peace in case of a future secession. In addition, 
the CPA implied internal recognition when South Sudan would secede, since northern Sudan                                                         13 IGAD Member States: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda (and currently also: South Sudan). 
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agreed on the prerequisites of the secession. Recognizing South Sudan would thus practically not 
interfere with Sudan’s affairs, since Sudan ex ante had agreed with a possible secession. 
  Before the agreements of the CPA came in force in 2005, a South Sudanese delegation led 
by Salva Kiir paid a visit to Beijing to discuss future economic opportunities.14 A friendship 
agreement was signed soon after. In 2008, a Chinese consulate even opened its doors in Juba 
(Salman, 2011: 155, 156; Large 2009). From China’s perspective, this was still on the basis of 
non-interference since the government of Sudan (GoS) and South Sudan had agreed upon this 
new division of territory. This could be explained by the fact that the southern SPLM was legally 
incorporated in the northern Government of National Unity as was agreed upon in the CPA. 
Because of this, it was politically and legally possible for Beijing to establish a direct relation with 
Juba as well. Since it thus already had an indirect relation with the SPLM. Large (2009, p. 621) 
typifies China’s approach to Sudan around that time as ‘one Sudan, two systems’, hinting to 
China’s domestic governing structure with respect to Taiwan. 
 Moreover, South Sudan would eventually not secede with help of any external military 
force or as a result of an externally imposed idea, like the UN had done in Kosovo’s case. The 
secession and recognition of South Sudan therefore was perceived as a lesser threat to China’s 
domestic status quo. The secession process included a mutual agreement, which in China’s case 
would never be reached. And, the secession process was less insinuating to any potential chance 
of foreign intervention in China. 
When the CPA was signed in July 2005, it was clear that South Sudan, presenting multiple ethnic 
groups, did not have one uniform society. Several struggles continued despite the ceasefire. 
However, the results of the national elections in 2010 showed a clear split between the north and 
the south. 71,1% of the Sudanese voted for the northern National Assembly, whereas 22.0% voted 
for the Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political branch of the SPLA 
in the south. Since these results almost exactly matched the relative demographics of both regions, 
now two one-party states had emerged and the secession of South Sudan became a serious 
prospect. Under the supervision of the UN and the African Union, the final referendum was held 
in January 2011. With a legally binding required minimum of 60 percent voting for the secession, 
99.57 percent of the southern Sudanese and 98.55 percent of Sudanese abroad voted for 
independence (Jooma 2005). This showed that a unified Sudan had not become a more attractive 
status after 2005 for the southern Sudanese. After South Sudan’s actual secession in July 2011 as 
was agreed upon in the CPA, the Republic of Sudan officially announced its recognition of South 
Sudan on the 9th of July 2011 (Reuters 2011).                                                         14 John Garang de Mabior, former leader of the SPLM, had suddenly died in a plane crash weeks after the CPA came in force. Salva Kiir was now taking his role. 
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  During the six years in which the CPA was in force, China stabilized its contact with the 
SPLM with incremental steps of gaining trust, since it formerly had supported South Sudan’s 
enemy during the war (Large 2008; Large 2012). Therefore, within a few days of South Sudan’s 
successful unilateral declaration of independence from Sudan, China’s foreign minister officially 
gave a diplomatic approval for the birth of the new state. In the Sudan Tribune of July 10th 2011, 
the official statement with respect to China’s recognition of South Sudan by Foreign Minister 
Yang Jiechi was as follows: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China announces its 
recognition of South Sudan, and from now on with the establishment of diplomatic relations at the 
ambassadorial level. China is ready on the basis of peaceful coexistence, with the development of 
friendly relations and cooperation in all areas of South Sudan.“ 
 
4.2.3 China’s involvement 
Diplomatic ties between the PRC and Sudan were established in 1959, three years after Sudan’s 
independence from Britain. At the time, the PRC needed new connections to gain more 
international support and recognition. Like many other new political relations initiated in Africa, 
China’s diplomatic glue mostly promoted a common history of suffering under colonialism, and 
related on a manipulated story about the origin of interstate links. China-Sudan relations allegedly 
were going back to the mid 19th century, when the British General Charles ‘Chinese’ Gordon who 
played a great part in the repression of the Taiping rebellion15, was murdered by a Sudanese man 
during his time as governor of Sudan (Strauss 2009, p. 784). In 1964, relations were consolidated 
during Zhou Enlai’s first big tour to Africa. During his visit to Sudan he propagated China’s 
fraternity on the basis of colonial history, and their willingness to help overcome this history, 
politically and economically (Strauss 2009, p. 783, 784). Bilateral ties however remained mostly 
symbolic and low-level. The principles of non-interference and sovereignty kept China neutral 
towards the civil war that had broken out, even before the establishment of the relation with the 
northern government of the war-torn country.  
  Relations got more serious after Sudanese president Gaafar Nimeiri visited China in 1970. 
After this visit, China provided Sudan with its first non-conditional and interest-free loan. China 
also financed the building of the Friendship Hall in Khartoum, which is still a major landmark 
today, and sent their first foreign medical team to Sudan. In return, Sudan could repay its loan                                                         15 Mao Zedong glorified the Taping rebels against early examples of heroic resistance against a corrupt feudal system. The imperial yellow jacket that was given to Gordon for his services by the Qing emperor, now hangs in the Khalifa museum (Sudan) and is still used as a standard stop for Chinese delegations that visit Sudan to this day. 
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with crops and started exporting cotton to China. After a failed coup against the Sudanese 
president Nimeiri by Sudanese army officers that had close ties with the pro-Soviet Sudanese 
Communist Party (SCP) in 1971, Sudan-China relations became even closer. China benefited 
from the blame that was put on the USSR and provided Sudan with a second interest-free loan and 
offered to take over the training and equipment of Sudanese armed forces, which was the former 
responsibility of the USSR (Shinn and Eisenmann, p. 251).  
  After the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) led to peace in 1972, Western oil companies 
Shell and Chevron were the first to profit from anti-Soviet sentiment in the government, and 
began their first oil drillings in the Red Sea. Two years after the first oil was discovered in the 
Bentiu region in 1978, president Nimeiri divided the South into three separate regions, creating a 
new state in the South where the oil was found, called Unity State. However on the map attached 
to the decisive bill, the Unity state was now part of northern Sudan. This caused commotion 
amongst southerners. Subsequent oil discoveries in the region made the power struggle over the 
south and the oil regions more aggressive. Earnings from future oil extraction in the south would 
benefit the central government directly. The central government namely initiated development of 
oil refineries in the North and not in the South where the oil was found, and the oil-export through 
the northern harbour Port Sudan generated a ‘division of labour’ between the north and the south. 
Due to the establishment of this new oil infrastructure (Figure 2), the north would benefit in a 
highly unequal manner compared to the South. As a reply, the SPLM/A started to attack oil 
installations and (mostly Western) oil companies that were assumed to be working with the 
central government in Khartoum (Jooma 2005, p. 11). This continued during the second civil war, 
which broke out in 1983.  
  The traditional political China-Sudan relation became more strategic after 1989. Around 
the same time, the National Islamic Front (NIF) of al-Bashir seized power in Sudan. This new 
Sudanese government faced much adversity and outside critic as it was violating human rights in 
a still ongoing and brutal civil war.16 Al-Bashir therefore turned to China for financial assistance. 
After he had suggested China to develop Sudan’s petroleum reserves, China’s oil investments 
started to rise as well as Sudan’s oil exports (Figure 2). In addition to investing $6 billion in the 
oil sector, China provided more soft loans for hydroelectric power stations, agricultural schemes, 
dam constructionss, and infrastructure projects (Jooma 2005, p. 12). Soon, operations for the first 
pipeline towards Port Sudan followed by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). 
After the pipeline was finished in 1999 and went in operation by the CNPC, who was also 40%                                                         16 In the 1990s, amongst many other oil corporations, Chevron suspended its Sudanese operations after the 
abduction and killings of some of its expat workers, due to the conflict situation between the SPLM/A and the 
central government of al-Bashir. And after Sudan failed to pay the World Bank for loans and special sanctions 
were in force against Sudan, U.S. companies were no longer allowed to invest in Sudanese oil after 1997. 
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stakeholder (Appendix 4), the first oil shipments could leave Port Sudan. This resulted into China 
becoming Sudan’s most important oil importer.  
  However, China also exported a fair share of goods to Sudan in return (Appendix 4), 
among which small arms (Figure 3). China’s maintenance of principles of non-interference and 
sovereignty received much pressure, for it was dealing these arms to the National Islamic Front 
(NIF), which was at war with the SPLA (Large 2009, p. 611). China initially denied and later 
argued, it was only one of the actors that were giving the NIF active military support despite an 
UN embargo17. When the UNSC finally condemned Sudan giving its central government a month 
to retreat its militias in 2004, a measure for which China abstained from voting due to its strong 
bilateral relation, Sudan’s central government did not respond (Straus 2005, p. 124-126).  
 
Figure 2. Crude oil production and consumption in Sudan and South Sudan, 1990-2012 
(1000 b/d) 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Available from: < 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Sudan/sudan.pdf> [6 June 2014] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         17 Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Arms transfers to Sudan: (1997-2010): Russia ($751m); China ($210m); Belarus ($118m); Iran ($44m); Poland ($12m); Ukraine ($7m). 
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Figure 3. Sudanese oil for Chinese Small Arms 
 
 
 
Source: Human Rights First, Available from: < http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/080311-cah-arms-sales-fact-sheet.pdf> [7 June 2014] 
However, during the negotiations between the north and the south that eventually led to the CPA, 
a war broke out in Sudan’s western Darfur region in 2003. Locally, an ethnic conflict over 
resources had evolved since the 1980s between ethnic Africans and ethnic Arabs. Due to the fact 
that the fighting parties in Darfur were never represented in peace talks, which were held between 
the north and the south around that time, the government in Khartoum quickly responded to the 
violence by arming the Arab tribes to eliminate the rebellion. The original fight against two 
rebellion groups18 led to uncontrolled killings of black “Africans” from three tribes. When the war 
in Darfur still continued when the ceasefire of the CPA came in force, the international 
community, especially the US, hesitated to call the violence genocidal, as it would not be able to 
fulfil its moral plight to military interference. This gave more leeway for violence. However, due 
to the fact that 90 percent of the light weapons used in Darfur were traced back to China, the 
international community started to exert pressure on China to stop its weapons trade and to 
pressure al-Bashir to stop the violence. With the Beijing Olympic Games in sight, China 
increasingly complied and started to encourage the GoS to curb its militias and to accept the 
presence of a hybrid African Union-UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur in 2006 (Attree 2012, p. 
18; Human Rights First, 2008).                                                          18 Rebellion groups: ‘the Sudan Liberation Army’ & ‘Justice and Equality Movement’. 
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 At first sight this change of behaviour would not be relevant for this case study, focussing 
on the secession process of South Sudan. However, when the CPA came in force in 2005, and 
China established relations with the GoSS, CNPC was the main economic actor for the oil 
exploitation in the South. When the first oil fields were discovered in southern Sudan, China had 
invested heavily in the oil extraction development, including the financing of the pipelines 
towards the northern harbour Port Sudan (Appendix 5). Since 75 Percent of the Sudanese oil 
reserves were located in the south, providing an estimated 95% of the total income of the 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS), China’s investments would largely be under GoSS’ control 
after a future secession. With this insight, peace between the North and the South would 
contribute to the safety of China’s oil extraction companies. China therefore started to mediate 
negotiations between the north and the south, as it urged both parties to “adhere to peace and to 
restrain themselves” (Attree 2012, p. 18), simultaneously, soothing both relations with increasing 
aid assistance (Appendix 6). 
  When South Sudan’s independence neared in 2010, the GoSS still explicitly pointed out, 
that if China wanted to hold its oil assets in the south it would have to recognise the outcome of 
the future referendum on South Sudan’s secession in case of a decision for independence (Attree 
2012: 17). South Sudan had never trusted China, as it was seen as Khartoum’s ally for its arm 
trade during the war. Clearly, this distrust had not entirely healed, despite the establishment of 
formal relations. Attree (2012) argues that this was an important reason for China to be one of the 
first to recognize the new country in 2011. However, looking at China’s prior friendly stance 
towards the GoSS, and China’s pressure on the GoS during the negotiations and Darfur, this 
demand would probably not have been necessary if China would not have had its formal stance 
against the Friendly Relations Declaration in the first place.  
   
4.2.4 China’s growing power 
After an accidental air raid on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo, China and Russia made a pact in 1996 to support each other against future unipolar US 
and NATO aggression. From a military viewpoint, both countries considered the NATO attack to 
be an aggressive act against sovereign Yugoslavia outside NATO’s area, and not a legitimate 
NATO intervention, as it was not backed by China and Russia in the UNSC. In addition, both 
countries agreed that the NATO attack was asymmetrical in terms of military strength and that 
this war was therefore a dangerous precedent for the future; even more so, since both countries 
expected more ethnic and regional conflicts on their own territory in the future. Therefore, as its 
military power was inferior to that of the US, China’s military leadership started to review and 
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increase its defence budget (Yoshiaki and Katsuhiko 2002, p. 1-4). This increase generated 
Western perceptions on China as a future threat to the international world order. Nurturing this 
threat was the fact that after 2005 the US and China got into a race for oil (Zhao 2008, p. 97) 
(Appendix 7). And, that China was trading arms to el-Bashir. Supporting an unpopular regime and 
selling it weapons was a controversial move. According to Alden and Hughes (2009, p. 568), 
China always wanted to maintain a low-profile role in Sudan’s case. It is at least remarkable that 
even prior to the international notion of China being a world power, Zhao Ziyang’s Africa tour in 
the 1980s, and Jiang Zemin’s tour in the mid-1990s did not pay a visit to Sudan. It is unclear 
whether this was due to the risky situation in Sudan, or China’s awareness of its own reputation. 
 However, as China accomplished so much in terms of its domestic economic reforms in 
the last few decades, Western countries increasingly expected that China assumed more 
international responsibilities, like Western countries with similar power statuses did (Yan 2006, p. 
7). Western negative judgements on China’s lack of taking responsibility could have been due to 
overestimating China’s power at the time, but it is hard to argue that China could not foresee 
foreign criticism on its arm deals with the government in Khartoum during the Sudanese civil 
war. Along many other sceptics, Alden and Hughes (2009) argue that China’s subsequent 
diplomatic claims to contribute to a harmonious world are doubtful. It was a consequence of 
China’s growing need for oil resources and its clinging on to its principles of non-interference and 
state sovereignty while investing in a relation with a suppressive regime, were the region that 
China had gotten caught up as one of the eventual crucial actors for the solution of the Sudan’s 
civil war.  
  When it became clear for China that it had to cooperate with two conflicting actors after 
the CPA came into force, it increasingly urged the SPLM and the GoS to adhere to the peace 
option (Carlson 2011). As China was the only international actor that had good relations with al-
Bashir -although under increasing pressure, China took on a mediating role in line with the 
African Union and the UN Security Council, cooperating with the international community 
(Attree 2012, p. 18; Large 2009, Large 2012). Although the conflict in Darfur continued until a 
ceasefire in 2010, China increasingly played an important part in pushing el-Bashir to comply 
with Western demands with respect to the situation in Darfur. Two external factors have 
contributed to this change in behaviour. Firstly, international pressure on China had pushed it 
towards a more active stance in the security situation. As Sudan’s foremost oil importer since 
1995, China was required to take more responsibility especially in case of Darfur where China’s 
weapons were used against civilians. This escalated to the point where the international 
community threatened to boycott China’s Olympics in 2008. 
  Secondly, following Zhang’s (2014) argument that China laid importance on the opinion 
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of local governing organs before it took its own position, the African Union might also have had 
an influence on China through its own call to end the violence in Darfur. African Union-China 
relations were naturally of strategic importance for China’s economic interest. In 2002, the 
African Union had adopted the principle of ‘non-indifference’ in the African Union’s Constitutive 
Act (Williams 2007, p. 254). The Chair of African Union Commission directly invoked this 
principle when the deployment of peacekeeping troops in Darfur began, after China’s 
encouragements to el-Bashir (Strauss 2009, p. 794). 
  
4.2.5 Conclusion 
Initially, China-Sudan relations developed from a state-to-state engagement into a state-supported 
economic engagement operating in public, while following the basic guiding principles for its 
foreign relations. The closeness of the relation with the government in Khartoum was a direct 
result of China’s need for more foreign oil sources and the American-led containment policy, 
which comprised international sanctions against Khartoum (Large 2009, p. 615). However, we 
can argue that after the CPA, China breached its principle of sovereignty to a certain extent, even 
if this was consistent with a political arrangement (Carlson 2011). China also broke with its 
principle of non-interference by pushing both parties into negotiations. However, China’s 
recognition of South Sudan was due to simultaneous internal and external pressures. Internally, 
China had to recognize South Sudan to secure its oil investments, which were mostly located in 
the south and were produced by over a decade of economic engagement. This was such a large 
percentage of China’s total oil imports that China had to interfere when the North failed to contain 
the situation, putting China’s oil workers in increasing danger (Large 2009). Peace would thus 
also benefit China due to its investments in the border transcending oil infrastructure, which had 
been under fire multiple times. However, China’s official recognition came after South Sudan’s 
threat to ban China’s oil companies if China would not recognize the country.  
  The external pressure on China to contribute to the peace came from different directions. 
China came under pressure from the West due to its arms trade with Khartoum and its unique 
relationship with Khartoum. With the Beijing Olympics in sight, the West had important new 
leverage. In addition, the African Union –an important organization for China- also wanted to 
stop the violence in Darfur.  
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Both South Sudan and Somaliland have a colonial pedigree related to the former British Empire, 
pursued former colonial borders after suppression from their central governments, and both their 
parent states had good diplomatic relations with China since the 1960s. Their unilateral 
declarations of secession from their non-colonial parent states, Somalia and Sudan, respectively, 
however received very different response from China. As was first hypothesized, China’s stance 
towards the Friendly Relations Declaration of the UN Charter would have an influence on China’s 
stance towards secessionism; as self-determination is the first step towards secession (Hechter 
1992). China’s statements against the UN Charter indeed largely justified China’s reaction 
towards the Somaliland secession, as it was no secession after colonial subjection. Moreover, at 
the time China had just received international criticism due to its repressive response to domestic 
uprisings. Then again, China’s domestic separatist groups in Xinjiang and Tibet, and the 
secessionist government in Taiwan are still present to this day, which have possibly made China’s 
stance towards secessionism, even foreign, even more sensitive (Zhu and Blachford 2005). 
Therefore, China’s recognition of South Sudan is contradictory, as the secessionist territory was 
just as valid as Somaliland’s secession relative to the content of the UN Charter, and it can 
therefore not be explained by China’s stance towards the Charter.  
  Self-determination is however not enough for a new state to function within the 
international arena. New states often need aid or assistance to built up their country, which will 
only be provided when being perceived as a member of concerning international organizations 
like the UN (Kreuter 2010). External recognition, a necessary prerequisite to be seen as a legal 
state, is according to international law only legal after internal recognition. China’s approach to 
this law has always been very strict due to its principles of sovereignty and non-interference in 
other state’s affairs. The ‘five principles of co-existence‘ worked as a mutual and reciprocal 
understanding, and recognizing a secessionist state would undermine these principles. Moreover, 
as both countries have had very good relations with China, having helped China in its pursuit to 
regain its seat in the UN and with the support of the ‘one China’ principle, China’s recognition of 
Somaliland and South Sudan would undermine these supportive relations. On that account, 
internal recognition of the host state was thus a necessary prerequisite for China to consider 
granting its recognition.  
  Alden (2009, p. 564) however argued that China’s “new type of strategic partnership with 
Africa”, illustrates how China’s state-centric principles of foreign policy are adaptive in 
comparison to its internal policies with respect to sovereignty and secessionism. This might be 
backed by China’s recognition of South Sudan. Why China abandoned these principles during its 
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close relations with Sudan’s central government in Khartoum, could be explained by the fact that 
the deliberations between el-Bashir as head of the National Congress Party and John Garang as 
leader of the SPLM had generated a mutual agreement for the structure of the CPA. As this 
agreement entailed the possibility of secession after a trial period in which the north would get the 
chance to make unification attractive, the odds were higher that an eventual secession would be 
internally recognized, and thus would become ‘authorized’ under international law (Vidmar 2012, 
p. 545). This would make the future recognition of a sovereign South Sudan a lesser breach with 
China’s relation with Sudan and therewith China’s own principles of sovereignty and non-
interference. However, the ambivalence of China’s political role in Sudan is illustrated on the one 
hand by the height of its aid, which China had to put in to maintain good relations with both 
parties during the CPA. On the other hand, China’s (still) ongoing arms trade with both the GoS 
and the GoSS thus is in complete contradiction to the aforementioned. 
  In Somaliland, deliberations on independence between different parties occurred before its 
declaration of independence, but without relevant actors from the central government in 
Mogadishu. The government had become completely absent after Barre’s fall, even to this day. 
Moreover, no proper assessment was made prior to the declaration of Somalilands’ independence 
on the time, the scope, the depth and the durability of the separatist sentiment. Differently put, 
neither an official referendum, nor a preceding trial-coexistence period was held to assess the 
internal legitimacy of the declaration. The support for the secession came primarily from the Isaaq 
clan, who were the majority of the population in Somaliland. Representatives of other clans, the 
few of whom were present during the conference in Bur’o and who actually did formally support 
the declaration, later claimed they only did so in order to keep the peace (Bryden 2004, p.24). 
Comparing the two secession processes thus showed how the principles of China’s foreign policy 
differently applied and therefore differently affected China’s eventual decision to recognize South 
Sudan and not Somaliland. 
  According to Shambaugh (2011) the People’s Liberation Army has an increasing 
influence in China’s foreign policy. This has made China less passive when it comes to its own 
interests and more willing to make risks in its pursuit. The third expected reason for China’s 
different reactions to both cases, which may have been due to the different timings of both 
secessions, was China’s political and economical involvement with the host state and the 
secession state prior to and during the secession. As became clear from the case study, China’s 
relations with the Somalia and Sudan were both typically politically motivated from the 
beginning. As Somalia’s underdevelopment was also reflected in the development of its national 
resource extraction, China’s motivation to cooperate with Somalia was not based on potential and 
lucrative future oil contracts. It was only in 2002 when first signs of China’s interest in potential 
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oil reservoirs on Somalia’s territory became clear (Aiddata, n.d.). Until now, Somalia’s main 
export product has always been livestock, a very low priority product on China’s import list. 
However, Somalia was an important supportive actor for China in the regaining of its membership 
and seat in the United Nations. This had boosted the bilateral relation with diplomatic positivity in 
terms of mutual benefit and mutual development. 
  Despite the instability in the country, China’s involvement in Sudan became much more 
intense and strategic in both political and economical ways, due to its economical initiatives in the 
1990s and its increasing demand for oil (Zhao 2008). China’s major oil State Owned Enterprises, 
particularly the CNPC, were largely responsible for setting up the oil infrastructure through which 
large amounts of oil would later be transported from the south to the north of Sudan. This led to 
China’s unique relation with Khartoum. However, when the SPLM started to attack China’s oil 
installations, because its government supported their opponent, China increasingly started to 
breach with its principles of sovereignty and non-interference (Carlson 2011). It took up a 
mediating role, stimulating both parties to negotiate and pursue peace and stability.  
  China played a very different part in both secessions as became clear by prior described 
circumstances, which may also be partially due to the different time periods in which these 
secessions have occurred. A gap of 20 years separates both secessions; a time in which China’s 
global power has increased due to its fast economic development and its high expenditure on 
defence. The final expectation of this case study was that China’s growing power also influenced 
its stance towards secessionism. A growing power would namely imply a lesser threat or lower 
pressure from the West on China’s domestic cases of secession. Meanwhile, due to China’s 
growing power, Western criticism on China’s secessionist cases morphed into a discussion on 
human rights to establish a normative dialogue at least. 
 China’s recognition of South Sudan was still under internal and external pressure. 
Internally, peace would contribute to a more efficient and safer oil trade. In addition, as has 
become clear, South Sudan still had to put pressure on China using China’s oil installations in the 
south as a leverage, as it did not trust China even after the CPA came in force and friendly 
relations were established. Were it not for the previous ongoing violence between the two parties 
that instigated international pressure for peace, and which became a danger for China’s oil 
interests, then South Sudan’s secession would have been more similar to China’s secessionist 
regions at home. Aside from this, China’s recognition of South Sudan’s secession also put less 
pressure on the Chinese government with respect to secession movements in Xinjiang, Tibet or 
Taiwan, since no mutual agreement with the host state would be possible in their cases. However, 
this approach oddly enough supports the will to fight of the more extreme separatist Uyghurs. 
External pressure for China’s involvement in South Sudan’s secession process was based on the 
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fact that China was the only foreign relation that could actually influence el-Bashir, and so within 
the UNSC China was pushed to step up as a mediator.     
  According to Large (2009, p. 626) China’s behaviour in Sudan is the most controversial 
relation in China’s recent rise in Africa. It is therefore harder to argue that the conclusions of this 
case study can contribute to further expectations in other African countries with respect to China’s 
possibly changing stance towards secessionism as well as for previous cases like Somaliland. 
Based on the previous findings, it is plausible to state that China’s economic interests are 
becoming more important than its principles of sovereignty and non-interference, although China 
may try to hold on to them for as long as possible. However, in that respect, Somaliland simply 
could not have enjoyed that advantage at the time, natural resources were not yet discovered and 
China was no world power yet, which have made a difference since (Appendix 8). The fact that 
no official trade data was available for China’s trade with Somalia before and during 
Somaliland’s secession, made the comparison even more difficult. However, clear is that China 
had no oil interests in the country at the time, and that may well have been the crucial difference 
between the two cases. For a more consistent support of this assumption, more comparative 
research must be done on other separatist movements in other African countries with relations to 
China. However, taking the prior case study into account, China’s growing power might generate 
an even smaller chance that a secessionist case will be recognized by China in the future.  
  On the other hand, as Kerr and Xu (2005) argue, changes in China’s foreign policy might 
still occur specifically with respect to security situations. According to Wheeler (2002) China’s 
support in the UN has been strong in cases with violations of human rights in external conflicts 
with a more international character, thus only when the conflict is not a domestic affair of a state. 
China’s position in the case of Darfur fairly illustrates this. China might thus be changing into a 
more stable, responsible international actor in a different way by providing more personnel to UN 
peacekeeper organizations in Darfur and South Sudan, although it still prefers peaceful 
negotiations to interventions (Large 2009). There are signs that China is working on 
improvements in the field of human rights (Xinhua, 2013), and that it is increasingly breaching 
with the principle of non-interference. During the writing of this thesis, news got out through 
various unofficial media reports that China is going to send 850 extra UN peacekeepers to South 
Sudan in an effort to contain the civil war that started last December. This is an intervention, as 
the first of its kind in terms of its magnitude. This might again only be for the protection of 
China’s interests in the country, but which is still the same as taking more responsibility in 
security situations. 
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At present-day China still lacks a diplomatic strategy for its African relations, as its rhetoric 
through the years has not changed much. However, as the content of bilateral relations has 
changed with respect to growing bilateral interests, this strategy might be wise to develop (Strauss 
2009, p. 793). The assumption that the OAU’s opinion about Somaliland’s secession, as well as 
the AU’s ‘non-indifference’ principle with respect to the Darfur crisis influenced China’s further 
reaction to the secessionist states, seems fairly grounded when looking at the present. The 
FOCAC, to which the AU is a member, has become an increasingly important institution for 
economic engagements. And in January 2013, China finished the building of the new $200 
million AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, as a ‘gift to Africa’ (UN Africa Renewal 2013). Due to 
the influence of the AU and its growing economic interests, China’s view of its international 
responsibility might therefore still change.  
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